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Dominic Mazoch posted:

OK, who give it self awareness?  Something in its programming.  Who programmed it.  HUMANS!  Actually, I think it had programming to kill the crew and go to Jupiter on its own.

James Kirk placed a program in the Star Fleet training simulator.

We have computer programs or data banks being hacked daily in the real word.  People are trying to get into DOD computers.  So even here, nothing is not safe?

For heavens sake man, you're talking about MOVIES!!!!!   Hollywood "stuff"!!!!!  None of that crap relates to the real world of modern railroading.

I thought NS placed the wrong computer program tapes on the night of the Conrail split?

Point at hand:  Some situation did cause the NJT train to crash into the terminal speeding up during that time.  Cause at time of this post under investigation.

Could PTC or some automated system prevented this:  In theory, and if everything works, yes.  

But no system, human or automatic, will be 100% safe at all times.  One has to have constant situational awareness at all times.

 

A few years ago I was on the mountain at Gallitzin on the NS mainline waiting to take pictures. There was no train traffic and it was irritating. Finally I happened to hear a dispatcher tell a crew that the NS computer was down-the whole thing !!  Eventually they started running some trains at reduced speeds and by track authority provided by the dispatcher. It lasted for sometime. Lesson: It can happen.

C W Burfle posted:

Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong.  Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!

If the computers don't talk to anything, then they cannot be hacked without physical contact.
Programs can be written poorly. I haven't heard anything about programming errors on the various automobile computers.


Define "programming error".  There have already be 2 deaths with Tesla cars in "autopilot" mode where the car simply ran into the back of another vehicle or object.  A number of years ago when Volvo invited the press to see their new avoidance technology, the car ran right into the back of the test semi. Remember the Primus throttle issues a few years back, did we ever get a solid here is the issue from anyone regarding those issues?   I promise you I will never trust an auto piloted vehicle to successfully navigate snow/ice covered highways.   Assist with traction control, YES, pilot, No.  Remember, most of these systems are "reacting" to the environment, and not "thinking ahead" as humans are capable of doing.  IMHO, the best systems are where humans and machines work in unison, to overcome the inherent weakness in each other. 

You are right about computes not being able to be hacked if they are not connected to anything without physical contact.  However, may I suggest a search on Jeep/Chrysler cars being hacked and controlled without physical contact.

I work in the tech. industry for a very large plane mfg. and am 100% for implementing new technology to make things better, safer, etc. ,etc., just don't like it being painted as risk or error free.

Prayers for all those and families that have been affected by this accident.

 


"IMHO, the best systems are where humans and machines work in unison, to overcome the inherent weakness in each other. "

I can live with that, provided the human has situational awareness.

"You are right about computes not being able to be hacked if they are not connected to anything without physical contact.  However, may I suggest a search on Jeep/Chrysler cars being hacked and controlled without physical contact."

I think the concept of "contact" needs to be widened.  We think of contact as something like wires.  But could "contact" include interfacing with electrons?

You are right about computes not being able to be hacked if they are not connected to anything without physical contact.  However, may I suggest a search on Jeep/Chrysler cars being hacked and controlled without physical contact.

The Jeeps had (or have) a wireless network connection. They were hacked through that connection. From an article I found:

The US hackers said they used just a laptop and mobile phone to access the Jeep’ s on-board systems via its wireless Internet connection. 

 Define "programming error". 
 
A programming error causes a computer to do something other than what was intended for it to do.

Somebody set off an EMP or a huge spark gap generator, and all bets are off!   One can build the later without needing any radioactive materials!

A heartbeat (watchdog signal) could be used to verify that the systems are up and running. No heartbeat, and the train shuts down.

Regardless, are todays trains mechanically controlled, or is there a whole bunch of electronics controlling the locomotive? If there are electronics, wouldn't the EMP affect them anyway?

 

The latest I read as of a couple of days ago is that the engine apparently was running at like 8mph coming into the station in idle, then accelerated to like 21mph, then at the last second the engineer threw it into emergency braking and put the throttle into idle.   From the description, I wonder if the guy had some sort of seizure and ended up pushing the throttle into position 4 (according to the article I read, that is about halfway), then came to and tried to stop it. That kind of eliminates one theory out there, that the guy was trying to commit suicide by train (didn't say it was a good one). 

One question for train guys in the know, the article made it sound like the controller in the forward cab was gated, would it be? Reason I ask is if the controller is gated, the idea that the engineer passed out and pushed the throttle higher wouldn't fit if what they meant by gating is what I have seen elsewhere (for example, the shifter on some cars is like that). 

Which way does the desk top  throttle work? pushing it ahead to increase  speed?   I'm old school and first generation  throttles increase speed by pulling it towards you. . (8 notches) I can't picture someone flopping on the throttle .

Maybe the guy was distracted by reaching down and packing up his grip  at the end of his run. 

I guess we'll eventually find out.  

Seems the terrible derailment  with train 188 was also due to a distraction. (talking on the company radio for quite a few minutes  and not paying attention to the 50 per curve ahead)

 

Originally posted by Jim Pastorious:

I read they pulled the train out of the building-has anyone seen any photos of it ??

 

Well here is a photo of part of the cab car that ran through the bumper:

http://www.ooyuz.com/geturl?aid=13451023

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10...oken-crash.html?_r=0

I wonder if the NTSB will force NJT to install larger higher speed end of track bumpers?

Gregg posted:

Which way does the desk top  throttle work? pushing it ahead to increase  speed?   I'm old school and first generation  throttles increase speed by pulling it towards you. . (8 notches) I can't picture someone flopping on the throttle .

Maybe the guy was distracted by reaching down and packing up his grip  at the end of his run. 

I guess we'll eventually find out.  

Seems the terrible derailment  with train 188 was also due to a distraction. (talking on the company radio for quite a few minutes  and not paying attention to the 50 per curve ahead)

 

 

Number 90 posted:
bigkid posted:

One question for train guys in the know, the article made it sound like the controller in the forward cab was gated, would it be? Reason I ask is if the controller is gated, the idea that the engineer passed out and pushed the throttle higher wouldn't fit if what they meant by gating is what I have seen elsewhere (for example, the shifter on some cars is like that). 

The answer is yes -- and no.

When the throttle/dynamic brake controller lever is at IDLE, mechanical interlocks prevent movement in either direction until a reverse lever is inserted and seated in its receptacle.  The reverse lever has a ridge with a notch in it.  There is a spring-loaded lever inside the receptacle that must be moved to release the mechanical interlocks.  The ridge on the reverse lever does this, and the notch secures the lever so it is not accidentally removed.  The throttle/dynamic braking lever must be at IDLE for the interlocks to allow the reverse lever to be removed or inserted.

So, that was the first gate that must be passed.  The second is that the throttle/dynamic braking lever must be moved sideways against spring tension in order to move it out of IDLE, to Dynamic Braking.  To move from IDLE to Run-1 through Run-8, there are stops to hold the throttle in each notch, but no gate.

Beyond that, there is no gate.  The throttle positions have stops, much like the floor shifter of a car with automatic transmission, but the lever moves straight from one notch to the next.  Movement toward the Engineer increases throttle position, whereas movement toward the front of the locomotive reduces throttle position.

In dynamic braking, once past the initial detent, the lever moves freely, without detents, throughout its entire range until maximum dynamic brake position is reached.  The dynamic brake lever moves in the same direction as the air brake levers -- clockwise, or toward the front of the locomotive for more braking, or counterclockwise, or toward the Engineer for less braking, or complete release.  This applies to upright control stands as well as to desk-type control panels, and is unchanged from the days of the very first road diesels in the late 1930's, to provide consistency and eliminate a possible source of confusion in emergency situations.

 

Last edited by Number 90

But it seems that no one mentions the locomotive on rear end/push end that weighs much more than a cab car or passenger car...would the damage have been same if locomotive was on head end of train #1614 ?? 

Other than first inbound train on a NJT commuter line into Hoboken, locomotives are usually on rear facing/westward end because of noise abatement protocols. 

Walter M. Matuch

Number 90 posted:
Number 90 posted:
bigkid posted:

One question for train guys in the know, the article made it sound like the controller in the forward cab was gated, would it be? Reason I ask is if the controller is gated, the idea that the engineer passed out and pushed the throttle higher wouldn't fit if what they meant by gating is what I have seen elsewhere (for example, the shifter on some cars is like that). 

The answer is yes -- and no.

When the throttle/dynamic brake controller lever is at IDLE, mechanical interlocks prevent movement in either direction until a reverse lever is inserted and seated in its receptacle.  The reverse lever has a ridge with a notch in it.  There is a spring-loaded lever inside the receptacle that must be moved to release the mechanical interlocks.  The ridge on the reverse lever does this, and the notch secures the lever so it is not accidentally removed.  The throttle/dynamic braking lever must be at IDLE for the interlocks to allow the reverse lever to be removed or inserted.

So, that was the first gate that must be passed.  The second is that the throttle/dynamic braking lever must be moved sideways against spring tension in order to move it out of IDLE, either to Run-1, or to Dynamic Braking.  

Beyond that, there is no gate.  The throttle positions have stops, much like the floor shifter of a car with automatic transmission, but the lever moves straight from one notch to the next.  Movement toward the Engineer increases throttle position, whereas movement toward the front of the locomotive reduces throttle position.

In dynamic braking, once past the initial detent, the lever moves freely, without detents, throughout its entire range until maximum dynamic brake position is reached.  The dynamic brake lever moves in the same direction as the air brake levers -- clockwise, or toward the front of the locomotive for more braking, or counterclockwise, or toward the Engineer for less braking, or complete release.  This applies to upright control stands as well as to desk-type control panels, and is unchanged from the days of the very first road diesels in the late 1930's, to provide consistency and eliminate a possible source of confusion in emergency situations.

 

Tom, like a motorcycle then? If the engineer was falling backwards it opens the throttle and releases the dynamic brakes? When a rider is falling off backwards their grip on the throttle causes it to rotate rearward towards wide open rather than closed making their situation worse as the motorcycle accelerates while they try and pull back on? (I've seen it occur numerous times.) 

Right you are, Wyhog.  There is no detent for going from IDLE to Run-1.  I corrected the post.  Thanks.

BobbyD, I understand the safety design of the motorcycle throttle control, and, falling off of the machine is indeed the worst case scenario, so it's protected by the method you described for preventing the riderless motorcycle from continuing to operate at full throttle.  However, in the case of the locomotive, the device for protecting against an Engineer becoming incapacitated, fainting, falling asleep, having a spell of something, or even falling out of the seat, is the Alertor (and - where used - Positive Train Control, ATS or ACS).  It is adequate protection for the most likely possibilities, but an Engineer becoming incapacitated while approaching the bumping post of a stub-ended track at low speed is a very, very unusual occurrence.  They can't protect against everything, but they do protect against the most likely Engineer failures.

One practical protection against hitting the bumping post -- and, if I do say so myself, a much more sensible one then making the Conductor occupy the control compartment with the Engineer -- is to require that the Conductor be required to station himself/herself at an open car door while the train is operating next to the terminal passenger platform, and be required to use the emergency brake handle next to that door, if necessary.

Last edited by Number 90

Sorry I have not read the entire thread.  Did anybody mention the value of a co-pilot?

I drove conveyances that had three autopilots and automatic brakes, and often 180 souls on board. One of the most valuable parts of the equation was a first officer - a backup for me and all three autopilots.

If we cannot afford firemen, then train the conductor and keep him in the cab.

opinion.

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