Read tonight that they have recovered the data recorder, video and the engineer's cell phone from the cab control car but no info from them yet. However, an unidentified official dealing with the wreck said that based on the damage incurred, they estimate the train speed was 2 to 3 times the 10 MPH limit. Time wil tell=maybe.
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Soooo.... Where was the penalty application in a cab signaled territory protected by a restricting signal? Something is rotten in Hoboken! Time will tell.
They finally questioned the engineer and he said he was only going 10 mph. HUH?????? Really???????
Rick
Considering the locomotive was at the end of the train, it seems like the engine was still pushing the consist after the initial impact. Or did the initial impact trigger a power-off signal to the locomotive?
Does an impact trigger a shut-down signal to a njt prime mover?
Tommy posted:Does an impact trigger a shut-down signal to a njt prime mover?
Sort of, it is called an "emergency air brake application".
Any actions after the front car hit the "bump" post (some bump! ) were not effective. The roof falling on it probably stopped it. I hope that event recorder was working.
If the engine was still pushing when the collision occurred, then, as soon as the brake pipe was broken or the brakes were applied in Emergency by any brake valve on the train, the pneumatic control switch ("PC Switch) aboard the locomotive would have immediately interrupted electrical current, e.g., stopped traction power. If head end power was being produced by an auxiliary engine, then the diesel engine would have reduced to idle when the PC Switch opened. If the prime mover rotated the HEP alternator or generator as well as the main alternator, then the engine would have continued to operate at elevated RPM's to keep the lights and HVAC operating, unless the HEP loop (to the head end of the train and back to the locomotive at the rear) was also broken.
jim pastorius posted:. . . an unidentified official dealing with the wreck said that based on the damage incurred, they estimate the train speed was 2 to 3 times the 10 MPH limit . . .
There's the cue. Information from an unidentified official -- especially if it's just a guess and not a number developed by investigation -- does not clear up anything, and is sometimes misleading.
Some interesting information has already come out concerning the event recorders:
1) The event recorder on the rear "Push-Pull" locomotive was non-functional, and hadn't been functional since July! Raises the question, how the the locomotive comply with federal law when it was out-bound, pulling the train?
2) Since the event recorder on the rear "push-Pull" locomotive was non-functional, the event recorder in the lead "Cab Car" had better be functional, since according to FRA regulations, the "rear" event recorder be non-functional is NOT an FRA violation.
3) Sounds like NJT maintenance and regulation compliance leaves a LOT to be desired!
Wait until this PTC is up and running and how well it is maintained. The commuter lines have a history of poor maintenance and management. Actually, I am a little tired of reading about all their problems(usually caused by poor management. Maybe Wick Moorman can change that.
Hot Water posted:Some interesting information has already come out concerning the event recorders:
1) The event recorder on the rear "Push-Pull" locomotive was non-functional, and hadn't been functional since July! Raises the question, how the the locomotive comply with federal law when it was out-bound, pulling the train?
This is not good. I will share some personal experience on the subject of event recorders:
Santa Fe was the largest early buyer of Pulse electronic event recorders, beginning, I think, in 1982. By the time I was promoted to Road Foreman of Engines in 1984, all even-numbered road engines were equipped with 8-event Pulse recorders, which used an 8-track cassette tape to record data. Later, the odd-numbered ones were also equipped. The cassette had to be removed and replaced with a blank cassette in order to read the data. At removal and at insertion, the cassette label was marked with the engine number, the time, the location, and the wheel diameter. The data was turned into a continuous paper roll chart by playback on a "blue box". Each cassette recorded 4 days' worth of data. Santa Fe was the only major railroad that routinely gathered and examined event recorder data. The Mechanical Department pulled the cassettes and measured the event recorder drive wheel diameter on every equipped locomotive that was fueled at Barstow, Belen, Kansas City, Chicago, and Temple. They had a full time event recorder technician at Kansas City, Belen, and Barstow, who printed every cassette's data and mailed the charts out to Road Foremen over whose territory the locomotive had run. Since my office was at Barstow, I got a hand delivery of 5 to 10 westbound charts daily, plus a weekly thousand miler with about 15-20 eastbound charts. I sent a short note to every Engineer I checked, so they all new that we cared what they did, and that is important in keeping order. If people know that their supervisor cares what they do, most will want to do what will get his approval and avoid his disapproval.
The event recorder specialist flagged any locomotive whose data recorder was not working and it was soon repaired. He was also able to identify locomotives with transition problems or surging amperage in dynamic braking, and these were also reported.
Dare I say that event recorders stopped most speeding stretch braking, as well as "grandstanding" where a stop was required on the Santa Fe?
Most other roads only removed their cassettes when there was an incident such as an accident, an injury, or a rule violation. Some of the ones I removed from the sealed Pulse box of foreign line locomotives had been there so long that, in spite of the seal around the door of the box, there was enough dust on the cassette that I could not read the label without cleaning it. Some were inoperative and the only thing that could be said about that was that the event recorder had failed some time after the cassette was last inserted, which sometimes was months previous.
Later, after the merger, when BNSF standardized on electronic Pulse event recorders on all road locomotives, the railroad opted for download by radio. So, today, every equipped locomotive downloads its event recorder into a central computer server, every time the locomotive stops for fuel at Temple, Belen, Kansas City, Barstow, Los Angeles, and numerous other locomotive service facilities across the railroad. Each Road Foreman of Engines is required to examine event recorder data on a number of trains weekly. Additionally, each Engineer must be checked quarterly by event recorder analysis, in addition to other required contacts and rides. The software even automatically flags and notifies the Road Foreman of any emergency brake applications, deep brake pipe reductions, penalty brake applications, etc. It also catches any faulty event recorders. This keeps almost all Engineers (and Road Foremen) honest.
I don't know how other railroads collect and utilize event recorder information, but routine examination has proved to be quite beneficial to ATSF and BNSF for 34 years.
Hot Water posted:Some interesting information has already come out concerning the event recorders:
1) The event recorder on the rear "Push-Pull" locomotive was non-functional, and hadn't been functional since July! Raises the question, how the the locomotive comply with federal law when it was out-bound, pulling the train?
Good question Jack, wonder if it is like that by us?
2) Since the event recorder on the rear "push-Pull" locomotive was non-functional, the event recorder in the lead "Cab Car" had better be functional, since according to FRA regulations, the "rear" event recorder be non-functional is NOT an FRA violation.
Seems both recording units should be required to function in a Push-Pull operation.
3) Sounds like NJT maintenance and regulation compliance leaves a LOT to be desired!
Like most government run operations!
AMTRAK is a commuter railroad like the rest of them. None that I know of are well managed.
It really is not difficult. Amtrak operated over my assigned territory at Barstow, and, once monthly on a different date each month, I had a calendar reminder to ask the Mechanical Department to remove a tape cassette and send me a chart from No's 3 and 4, for routine checking. Of course, in that case, the passenger railroad operated on a freight railroad, and we had a legitimate interest in how their trains were being operated. Their Road Foreman was almost never on the engine -- which ran on my territory during the night -- and The Amtrak crews all knew that we did this. Same thing as with freight -- if they know you care, they do their best work. When the passenger railroad owns the track and the train, it's all on them to care about the routine operation of trains.
However, transportation agencies have many in management who have had absolutely no railroad operation experience and thus do not have clearly structured processes for safe train operation. Lots of time in the office chair and little time in the field does not help their comprehension. This wreck will get the attention of the NTSB and the FRA, and commuter railroads will see more FRA Mechanical inspectors and may have to live with some new regulations. It's always best to do it right yourself, instead of causing the government make you do it.
I'll say one thing about the NJT situation. They have a large number of Engineers, all working in the morning and in the evening, and they would need more than the usual number of Road Foreman to an effective job of evaluating each Engineer because all their Engineers are working at the same time. A lot of their Conductors are mainly doormen, not experienced railroaders, and not really sharp on knowing what is good and what is bad about the routine performance of an NJT Engineer. The old freight Conductors would come to me and complain about the weak Engineers. That probably does not happen at NJT, so their management needs more field managers than a freight railroad might.
And remember: We still do not know the root cause of this accident, even though we are finding out some embarrassing things that need to be corrected. As I said in another thread, we can't protect against everything -- only against conditions most likely to affect safety. Let's not rush to judgement about the cause.
From ABC News 4 days ago:
"The FRA began taking a closer look at NJ Transit early this year for two reasons -- "a leadership vacuum" and because the FRA "started to see more violations of safety rules," the source said.
A "deep audit" of the NJT that was begun in the spring and completed in June, looking mostly at operations, found "dozens of safety violations," mostly in the operations area, and the FRA informed the NJT of the violations, the source said. Violations were transmitted and a monetary penalty was issued.
Prior to the Hoboken incident, the FRA was "preparing next steps" and "considering more enforcement actions," but FRA had not acted on it, the source said."
Keystone posted:From ABC News 4 days ago:
"The FRA began taking a closer look at NJ Transit early this year for two reasons -- "a leadership vacuum" and because the FRA "started to see more violations of safety rules," the source said.
A "deep audit" of the NJT that was begun in the spring and completed in June, looking mostly at operations, found "dozens of safety violations," mostly in the operations area, and the FRA informed the NJT of the violations, the source said. Violations were transmitted and a monetary penalty was issued.
Prior to the Hoboken incident, the FRA was "preparing next steps" and "considering more enforcement actions," but FRA had not acted on it, the source said."
Translation - because Transit is a public transit agency and one with fiscal woes the monetary penalty from one level of government to the next was light.
The NTSB has posted an update from data that was recorded - the train was accelerated from 8mph to 21mph during its last 38 seconds before it crashed into the station...
Njt has just changed the rules to trains coming into Hoboken and Atlantic City terminals. Njt is requiring two sets of eyes when in the terminal. So both the engineer and conductor must be calling signals and watching track when in the terminal area.... regardless if cab car or loco are in front.
prrhorseshoecurve posted:Njt has just changed the rules to trains coming into Hoboken and Atlantic City terminals. Njt is requiring two sets of eyes when in the terminal. So both the engineer and conductor must be calling signals and watching track when in the terminal area.... regardless if cab car or loco are in front.
That's just knee jerk reaction from unknowing politicians. Think about that for a second:
1) If the Conductor/Trainman/Ticket collector doesn't make it forward to the Cab Car, does the Engineer have to stop and wait for someone?
2) I the very rare case that a locomotive is leading on the train into Hoboken, the Conductor can NOT access the cab of the locomotive unless that Conductor boards the locomotive cab during the last stop prior to Hoboken Terminal.
Just how many of these "going too fast" commuter accidents have we had lately? Are the engineers in poker games back in the first car, with it on autopilot? I
colorado hirailer posted:Just how many of these "going too fast" commuter accidents have we had lately? Are the engineers in poker games back in the first car, with it on autopilot? I
Another uneducated statement!
Are NJT trains run by NJT itself, or are they contracted out?
NJ Transit hires and trains it's own engineers.
Requiring a second person in the cab only during the approach to the final terminal is just plain silly. If the engineers cannot be trusted alone to bring a train safely into the terminal (for whatever reason; medical, inattention, etc) then they cannot be trusted at any other point on the RR. They could over- speed a curve or run a stop signal at any point and potentially cause injuries and deaths. This "2nd man" order is just something useless to make it look like NJT is doing something about it. In the future if a train overruns a stop signal at MP 21.4 will they put out another rule that there must be 2 men in the cab when approaching MP 21.4?
This "2nd man" order is just something useless to make it look like NJT is doing something about it. In the future if a train overruns a stop signal at MP 21.4 will they put out another rule that there must be 2 men in the cab when approaching MP 21.4?
During the early days of the conversion from steam to diesel or electric, didn't the railroad employee unions argue that that fireman was still necessary to keep a second set of eyes and ears in the cab with the engineer?
The point being missed on the number of crew in the cab is that they must be trained, reasonably intelligent and motivated enough to do a good job. Obviously there are some things missing in the program.
From the report:
The NTSB said the train was traveling at 8 mph and the throttle was in the idle position less than a minute before the crash. The throttle was increased approximately 38 seconds before the collision and the train speeded up, reaching a maximum of about 21 mph, the agency said.
The throttle went back to idle just prior to the collision, and the engineer hit the emergency brake less than a second before the train hit a bumping post at the end of the rail line.
EscapeRocks posted:From the report:
The NTSB said the train was traveling at 8 mph and the throttle was in the idle position less than a minute before the crash. The throttle was increased approximately 38 seconds before the collision and the train speeded up, reaching a maximum of about 21 mph, the agency said.
The throttle went back to idle just prior to the collision, and the engineer hit the emergency brake less than a second before the train hit a bumping post at the end of the rail line.
What is even more interesting is, according to the FRA/NTSB investigators, the Engineer "slumped forward" (asleep?) and his hand moved the throttle forward from idle to position #4. The in-cab-video verifies the data on the event recorder.
Interesting. I hadn't seen that yet and was wondering how the actions unfolded. Asleep? Passed out momentarily from medical issue? NO matter, a bad situation for all involved.
Bad engineering design. The throttle should not be made to go forward in a case of sleep, fainting or similiar. The throttle should move back to increase speed, forward to slow or stop it.
My question is can this second person do anything other than pull the emergency brake if needed while coming into the terminal? Conductors/trainmen while in charge of the train are usually not qualified to operate same
A second person in the cab could monitor the engineer. If the engineer had a medical emergency, the second person could initiate an emergency stop.
Of course the person would need to be trained on how to make an emergency stop.
Is that difficult?
C W Burfle posted:My question is can this second person do anything other than pull the emergency brake if needed while coming into the terminal? Conductors/trainmen while in charge of the train are usually not qualified to operate same
A second person in the cab could monitor the engineer. If the engineer had a medical emergency, the second person could initiate an emergency stop.
Of course the person would need to be trained on how to make an emergency stop.
Is that difficult?
Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH!
Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
C W Burfle posted:Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
Dominic Mazoch posted:C W Burfle posted:Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
Computers were NOT running EITHER train in that Texas head-on crash!
Dominic Mazoch posted:C W Burfle posted:Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
HAL wasn't hacked. It became self-aware and had issues with humans.
Rusty
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
If the computers don't talk to anything, then they cannot be hacked without physical contact.
Programs can be written poorly. I haven't heard anything about programming errors on the various automobile computers.
Rusty Traque posted:Dominic Mazoch posted:C W Burfle posted:Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
HAL wasn't hacked. It became self-aware and had issues with humans.
Rusty
OK, who give it self awareness? Something in its programming. Who programmed it. HUMANS! Actually, I think it had programming to kill the crew and go to Jupiter on its own.
James Kirk placed a program in the Star Fleet training simulator.
We have computer programs or data banks being hacked daily in the real word. People are trying to get into DOD computers. So even here, nothing is not safe?
Dominic Mazoch posted:Rusty Traque posted:Dominic Mazoch posted:C W Burfle posted:Just how well did that work on that tragic BNSF high speed wreck in Panhandle, Texas some months ago. The "offending" train, with a Conductor and Engineer, failed to respond to a flashing yellow signal, a yellow signal, a red signal, and an oncoming train in front of them! They STILL kept going at 68 MPH
Well then, I guess the answer is to get rid of all the humans, and have computers run everything. If production cars can stop themselves, and automatically stay in lane, then a computer should be able to control a train.
Well, computers could be hacked, or programmed wrong. Ask Dave, who had a little issue with the computer on DISCOVERY I called HAL 9000!
HAL wasn't hacked. It became self-aware and had issues with humans.
Rusty
OK, who give it self awareness? Something in its programming. Who programmed it. HUMANS! Actually, I think it had programming to kill the crew and go to Jupiter on its own.
James Kirk placed a program in the Star Fleet training simulator.
We have computer programs or data banks being hacked daily in the real word. People are trying to get into DOD computers. It is possible for a worker to place something in the programming. So even here, nothing is not safe?
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