Deaths, injuries reported after Amtrak, CSX trains collide in South Carolina

Hot Water posted:

Steims posted:

Transportation disasters typically are never caused by a single event.  The systems we have tend to involve and element of human error and mechanical/electrical failures.  This event sure sounds like a dispatcher threw the switch

How do you know it was a "power switch", controlled by a Dispatcher?

not knowing the Amtrak was southbound and then the (known) signal failures failed to warn the Amtrak what was ahead. 

How do you know it was a "signal failure"?

 I suspect the Amtrak engineer started braking as soon as he saw the switch thrown but there was not enough distance to stop. 

Thoughts and prayers go out. 

 

The siding is very long which looks like a passing siding to me.  Zooming in on Google at each switch I see a metal enclosure/controls equipment. 

This "signal failure" was based on what was already reported.  Maybe signal outage would have been a better choice of words. 

"Typically, an automatic signal would have warned that the switch was in the wrong position, instructing the engineer to slow down. However, a crew had recently been working on the system in that area, and it may have been shut off when the incident occurred, the source said."

Steims posted:

Hot Water posted:

Steims posted:

Transportation disasters typically are never caused by a single event.  The systems we have tend to involve and element of human error and mechanical/electrical failures.  This event sure sounds like a dispatcher threw the switch

How do you know it was a "power switch", controlled by a Dispatcher?

not knowing the Amtrak was southbound and then the (known) signal failures failed to warn the Amtrak what was ahead. 

How do you know it was a "signal failure"?

 I suspect the Amtrak engineer started braking as soon as he saw the switch thrown but there was not enough distance to stop. 

Thoughts and prayers go out. 

 

The siding is very long which looks like a passing siding to me.  Zooming in on Google at each switch I see a metal enclosure/controls equipment. 

That would be the "electric lock" equipment for the MANUAL THROW switch. Since that is CTC territory, permission MUST be obtained from the Dispatcher to open the switch, then the "electric lock" is operated (which would NORMALLY change the signal indications on the main line signals, in both directions). Then, and only then, should/can the switch be opened manually. 

This "signal failure" was based on what was already reported.  Maybe signal outage would have been a better choice of words. 

Well, neither since it was a planned "Signal Suspension", meaning that there were many Signal Maintainers, and possibly contractors, working in that area, and the entire signal system was "off". As a result, the trains operating through that area, would be operating under Track Warrant Control from the Dispatcher. In fact, the Amtrak Conductor, who was also in the cab, was copying a Track Warrant from the Dispatcher at the time.

Additional information has recently been "discovered" that the CSX crew of the freight train "stored" in that siding, and already reported "clear" to the Dispatcher, when in fact, they may NOT have realigned the switch prior to the Amtrak train arrival. Thus, the Amtrak train entered the siding and ran head-on into the tied-down CSX freight train. 

"Typically, an automatic signal would have warned that the switch was in the wrong position, instructing the engineer to slow down. However, a crew had recently been working on the system in that area, and it may have been shut off when the incident occurred, the source said."

 

Latest is that the freight train was parked on the correct track, and that the Amtrak was on the wrong track.

The stored freight train was a northbound train that would have entered the south end switch into the passing side. The freight train apparently stopped approximately a 1/4 of a mile SOUTH of the north end switch into the siding. Thus when the freight crew indicated they were "clear", they would have been talking about the south end switch into the siding. The passenger train was going south and entered the passing siding thru the NORTH end switch and hit the freight train. I don't think the freight train crew would have been expected to walk up to the north end switch and check it since they didn't go thru that switch. The freight train would only been cleared to enter and stop in the siding.

It's not that unusual for a train to get stopped at a red signal in CTC territory and the Rail traffic controller can not clear the signal for unknown reasons   so written permission is given to pass the signal.   It could happen on single track  ,  2 or more tracks... The RTC will indicate the signal number, route  Train designation ,

A crew member is required to  take the switch off power , mesh the points and line the switch for the route given, could be one switch or maybe 4 or 5, The switch is then put back on power as the trucks of the engine occupy the points...

The train must  now proceed at restricted speed until   the next  permissible signal. Crews  must  now  be on  the look out for a broken rail. improperly lined switch , Being able to stop with in half the range of vision and in no case exceeding 15 MP   in ABS territory.

Having said that...If the Signal are suspended?  What type of track permits are issued???  Do crews just  run  absolute stop signals...???

It appears the  switch from the main to the track where the freight was parked was lined and lock for the service track. 

DG posted:

The stored freight train was a northbound train that would have entered the south end switch into the passing side.

Are you ABSOLUTELY sure about this?  It has been reported that the freight train "backed" into that side track.

The freight train apparently stopped approximately a 1/4 of a mile SOUTH of the north end switch into the siding. Thus when the freight crew indicated they were "clear", they would have been talking about the south end switch into the siding. The passenger train was going south and entered the passing siding thru the NORTH end switch and hit the freight train. I don't think the freight train crew would have been expected to walk up to the north end switch and check it since they didn't go thru that switch. The freight train would only been cleared to enter and stop in the siding.

NTSB • Press Conference with Illustrations.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ix7_bafC1oM

Play time: about two minutes

Source: AP

Gary

Based on the press conference in the previous post the switch into the siding was padlocked in place for the siding  not the mainline, they also stated that the freight worked the car carrier yard on the other side of the mainline then pulled north onto the mainline and backed down into the siding at that point the freight crew left the train, obviously someone had the responsability for resetting the switch to the mainline alignment, unless there was a signal further north on the line indicating that switch alignment the Amtrack crew at 2:30 in the morning would only have realized at the last moment the situation at 50 mph. I would think at a dispatcher/control board somewhere on the system there would be indicator lights for the mainline blocks and switch alignments. Tragic situation JMO

I do have some questions.  But I will wait on info from the NSTB before asking here.

Amtrak President and Chief Executive Richard Anderson said CSX was responsible for the tracks and signals, including one that had a lock attached to it and diverted the Amtrak train onto the side track.

"CSX had lined and padlocked the switch off the mainline to the siding, causing the collision," he said in a statement.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news...outh-carolina-crash/

Its obvious that human or mechanical error played a part in this accident.  The switch was set to the siding where the freight train was standing, not to the mainline.  At 2:30 AM in the darkness of night the engineer in the Amtrak cab at 59 mph never had a chance to touch the brakes or even hit the floor. He was a good engineer with a clean record and so was the conductor.  Since they own the tracks and do the dispatching CSX will probably pay big time for this error.

Railroading 101.

The normal position for a main line switch is lined (for the main line) and locked. 

In CTC territory.... if a main line switch is open in the  block ahead , there is no way a train can get a clear proceed signal..  

Looks like human error once more.  

If there had been someone in a caboose, would someone have said "hey we're hanging out here"?

I have no train experience, but I've never understood how an engineer knows what is going on a half mile or more behind him.

Prayers to the families.

Downsized this aerial pic a bit, and added some text as credit. Not my photo.

David

Dennis LaGrua posted:

 the engineer in the Amtrak cab at 59 mph never had a chance to touch the brakes or even hit the floor. 

And you know this how?
I'll wager that the engineer knew exactly what was going on when he lurched through that switch, put the train in emergency and that the impact was much less than the 59mph the news media is spouting out!

GVDobler posted:

If there had been someone in a caboose, would someone have said "hey we're hanging out here"?

I have no train experience, but I've never understood how an engineer knows what is going on a half mile or more behind him.

Prayers to the families.

WHAT???????? 

Caboose?????

Hanging out?????

Going on behind him?????

Not a single one of those things has ANYTHING to do with what happened.

I am sure you are right about the engineer realizing what was happening, unfortunately even if the train was at the posted track speed of 49 mph or less the short distance to the parked 2 engines and the train behind them represented a relatively immovable barrier for the Amtrack train with minimal protection for the crew up front. the lead freight engine was wiped out by the force of the crash, it was empty at that time. Correct me if I am wrong but would it not be the freight crews responsibility to realign the switch once they had cleared the mainline into the siding to park their train. JMO

Sorry the report that I read made it sound like the freight was on a siding but not all the way off and Amtrack hit the end of the freight. Very early report and obviously wrong.

I don't think this is a question of what happened anymore. That seems quite clear. The real question is WHY the switch was not aligned for the main. 99% sure this one isn't Amtrak's fault, they were the victims here. Someone at CSX is responsible for this, and when they figure out WHY, they'll also know WHO. It's a short list.

Of the three recent accidents, only the Washington State will be on Amtrak. This one and the garbage truck, they couldn't control. Outside factors.

The speed was reported to be 59 mph, and so was the maximum authorized speed that was reported. 

We all know better than to take a news media report at face value, but if — if — those two numbers are correct, they would match the report that the signal system was out of service or suspended and that trains in that territory were operating on authority other than signal indications, i.e, “dark” territory. Freight trains may not exceed 49 mph and passenger trains may not exceed 59 mph when operating on a track where there is no block signal or cab signal system in service. Some method, other than CTC which requires signals, of authorizing trains on main tracks would be required.  Track Warrant Control would be one such method, and is the most commonly used outside CTC.

If — again if — the signal system was suspended as reported, trains would be required to operate dual controlled switches in the territory by hand, i.e., the Train Dispatcher could not control any signals or switches.  The position of switches operated by hand would be governed by operating rules.  If Track Warrant Control was in use, the form copied by the Conductor of a train specifies if the switch is to be left lined for other than main track movement after being used by a train.

This would also be a reason for the Conductor to be riding in the cab of the Amtrak locomotive.

Lots of “ifs” here, but you should know that a lot of rules apply if a signal system is suspended. It is a big deal to suspend a signal system and run trains, not done often. They don’t just “turn off the lights” and tell trains to run. 

I was not comforted that the state Governor appeared before the news cameras and said that the freight train was on the right track and Amtrak was on the wrong track. What made him an authority on railroad operating practices and rules?

We will have to wait for a summary statement by the NTSB as to the method of operation in use in this horrible accident. They will give a statement soon, but the full report of all the whys wil not be forthcoming for a long time.

Amateur Drone Video | Amtrak Train Crash in South Carolina

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fp36W9L741E

Playtime about two minutes. Very unprofessional drone video but watchable. Over 27 thousand views at this time.

Gary

Big_Boy_4005 posted:

. . .  99% sure this one isn't Amtrak's fault, they were the victims here. Someone at CSX is responsible for this, and when they figure out WHY, they'll also know WHO. It's a short list.

I would suggest not not making a definitive conclusion yet.  There is not yet enough public information to conclude that CSX is responsible.  Always investigate first with an open mind, then make conclusions.  Otherwise you can go ready, fire, aim. 

When trains are operated under Track Warrant Control (TWC), and a train is to use a switch to enter a track and leave the switch in other than normal position, the crew must be instructed to do so on the Track Warrant.  This is often done, as there is nobody on the rear of the train to restore the switch position for main track movement.  The Train Dispatcher must instruct the next train authorized to pass that location that it must line the switch for its route before proceeding over it.

So, if -- again, if -- the track was temporarily being operated by TWC while the signal system was suspended, then there are questions which investigators must ask, including, but not limited to:

• Did the passenger train crash into the head end of the CSX train, or into the rear DP  consist?
• Was the last crew which used that switch, instructed to restore the switch position for main track movement, or were they instructed to leave the switch in the position last used by them?  Did they comply with whatever instruction they were given?
• Did the CSX train move onto the track through that switch, or did it move there from the other end of the track?  Was it a different train that actually last used the switch?
• Did the crew of a previous movement of CSX (or of another carrier having rights) trail through that switch without first lining it for its movement, thereby leaving a bent, run-through, switch with gapped switch points?
• If the previous train was instructed to leave the switch in the position last used, was the Amtrak train instructed to stop and restore its position for movement on the main track?
• Was the switch locked as required after last being used?  Was the feature of the suspended signal system that records the position of that switch and the time release switch lock feature still functional?  Was the dual control lever left in the Hand position (as required due to the suspension of the signal system), or had someone placed it in Power position, as would normally have been done if the signal system was in service?
• If -- once again, if -- the Amtrak train was instructed to stop and restore the switch position, then they obviously ran past the switch location at high speed.  How much experience did the Engineer and Conductor have?  How long had they been assigned to that territory?  Had they ever seen that location in daylight?  Were the last two mile posts that the Amtrak train passed, standing in their proper place, in good condition?  Did the Amtrak crew have an unobstructed view of those mile posts? What -- if anything -- do their personal records show about any prior serious rules violations?  What were their scores on their annual rules tests?  Did either of them require more than one attempt in order to pass their rules test?  Maybe they were not instructed to stop and restore the position of that switch.  If not, did the Dispatcher know that the switch was not properly positioned for main track movement?  If not, why not?  The last two questions are critically important.

So, was it the crew of the CSX train? A different CSX train?  A foreign line train?  The CSX Train Dispatcher?  The Amtrak Engineer and Conductor?  Someone else, who either found the switch unlocked or had a switch key and unlocked it and then lined it into the standing CSX train?  The presence of a Conductor on the passenger train locomotive is a likely indication that Track Warrants or other instructions were to be copied and there was likelihood that dual control switches could need to be operated by hand.

It will be easy to get records of instructions issued, repeated and copied.  If they are all in order it will require good investigation to determine whether the switch was locked. and whether the points were gapped.  But there are ways to determine this through good investigation of track components and structure.

Too early for a conclusion.  Lots of questions must be asked and answered first.

Oh Boy! Railroading at it's worst. The  removal of the caboose   meant new rules, Leaving main track switches open in dark territory was one of them.....  Having the next train stop  or section crews    line a main  switch back  normal   is foreign to me. 

Scary stuff for sure...

 Having CTC suspended is  something I've never run across....

Leaving a siding switch open after a train leaves a siding is one thing but leaving an main line yard or service  track switch is another story.... This switch was not a siding switch ,  It would be a power switch.

Track warrants produced at JAX are produced on a computer, hand done, or does it depend on the territory?

Dominic, Track Warrants copied en route are obviously done by hand.  Track Warrants in effect at the time a crew goes on duty are issued from a printer, along with Track Bulletins, messages, a list of cars in the train, and the call sheet (train ID, crew member names, on duty time, etc.)

Gregg, me either.  I worked 37 years for a class I railroad and never did encounter a signal system being suspended.

The CSX train BACKED into the siding... I'm not seeing where a caboose/crew have anything to do with resetting the switch in this instance.  We've all experienced Amtrak trains taking sidings or passing stopped freights on sidings... or passing other Amtrak trains.  My experience usually has shown the crew taking the siding works the switch and clears the main and resets the switch to the main.  We'll know what happened soon enough... but the NTSB takes their time... and lawyers will be involved... drug tests... etc...

Jon

I am curious as to what measures could be used to prevent if they're not any other than humans? Is there new types of technology that could help? So sad to see anything like this no matter where.

What KOOLjock1 posted is correct. It was in the statement the NTSB released last night. The CSX train was backed into the siding and tied down. It had been switching the automotive loading/unloading facility across the track. The train did not run out of time.

 The main question according to the NTSB, is who left the switch lined and locked for the siding. I have my own opinion, but will wait for the NTSB. to come to their conclusions. 

Tom, in all fairness to Jon,

The NTSB did say yesterday that the CSX loco were on the head end, and that the CSX train came out of the automobile loading facility, moved past the switch, then backed into the siding.

NTSB Prelim Brief 2/4

trainroomgary posted:

NTSB • Press Conference with Illustrations.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ix7_bafC1oM

Play time: about two minutes

Source: AP

Gary

Obviously some of the posters did not listen to this video of the "NTSB" director describing the circumstances as they knew them at the point in time the video conference was made, obviously the final reports are at least a year away .

KOOLjock1 posted:

The CSX train BACKED into the siding... I'm not seeing where a caboose/crew have anything to do with resetting the switch in this instance.  We've all experienced Amtrak trains taking sidings or passing stopped freights on sidings... or passing other Amtrak trains.  My experience usually has shown the crew taking the siding works the switch and clears the main and resets the switch to the main.  We'll know what happened soon enough... but the NTSB takes their time... and lawyers will be involved... drug tests... etc...

Jon

As I mentioned  I don't think this is a siding switch. It's more of a yard, storage or service track (IMHO) and any  MAIN  LINE switches to this track  have to be lined normal after use,,, At one time we never left a main line switch unattended  but those days are long gone,

Definition of a siding.... A track auxiliary to the main track for meeting or passing trains which is so designated the time  table , GOB, train order or DOB. I don't think this track fits the description if in CTC territory.

Just My 2 cents  .

Gene posted:

What KOOLjock1 posted is correct. It was in the statement the NTSB released last night. The CSX train was backed into the siding and tied down. It had been switching the automotive loading/unloading facility across the track. The train did not run out of time.

 The main question according to the NTSB, is who left the switch lined and locked for the main.

No. The crew of the CSX freight left the siding switch LINED an LOCKED for the SIDING! Thus, the Amtrak train entered the siding and crashed head-on into the tied-down CSX freight train.

I have my own opinion, but will wait for the NTSB. to come to their conclusions. 

Hotwater, Thank you for pointing that out. I wrote it wrong. It was lined and locked for the siding. 

Gregg it is a siding track that the train was tied down in. 

Gregg posted:

KOOLjock1 posted:

The CSX train BACKED into the siding... I'm not seeing where a caboose/crew have anything to do with resetting the switch in this instance.  We've all experienced Amtrak trains taking sidings or passing stopped freights on sidings... or passing other Amtrak trains.  My experience usually has shown the crew taking the siding works the switch and clears the main and resets the switch to the main.  We'll know what happened soon enough... but the NTSB takes their time... and lawyers will be involved... drug tests... etc...

Jon

As I mentioned  I don't think this is a siding switch. 

No, it is indeed a "siding", as in "passing siding" with access switches off the main line, at both the North end and South end. The published track charts, also show a "passing siding" on the other side of the main line, which allows access to the various track in the automobile loading/unloading facility, on that side of the main line.

It's more of a yard, storage or service track (IMHO) and any  MAIN  LINE switches to this track  have to be lined normal after use,,,

And there in lies the cause of the Amtrak train entering that siding!

At one time we never left a main line switch unattended  but those days are long gone,

You got THAT right.

Definition of a siding.... A track auxiliary to the main track for meeting or passing trains which is so designated the time  table , GOB, train order or DOB. I don't think this track fits the description if in CTC territory.

Again, the published track charts do indeed show that this was/is a "passing siding". Also, since this is "CTC territory", all the switches on the main line have "electric locks", which would activate a restrictive signal indication when the "electric locks" were accessed. The problem with the situation involved with this terrible tragedy is, a "Signal Suspension" was in affect, as Signal Maintainers were "working in the area", thus all trains entering such a work area, must be under Track Warrant Control from the Dispatcher. That was the reason that the Amtrak Conductor was in the cab of the Amtrak train, i.e. he was copying a Track Warrant at the time.

Just My 2 cents  .

FWIW....Some comments from having spent almost 4 decades working in the Operating Department of CSX and its' predecessors......'Signal Suspensions are relativity common on CSX. They are employed to allow operations to continue when updates and/or changes are being made to the physical track structure and/or signal system on a particular section of railroad. Instructions are issued and are very specific as to what rules are in effect and how train and equipment  movements are to be made through the limits during the suspension.  This is accomplished by the use of Track Warrant Control and EC-1 Forms (CSXs' authority for movement in non-signaled territory among other uses)  In this case the signal suspension was implemented due to the need to make changes necessary for installation of PTC. It had been planned to take effect Saturday morning and expire Sunday evening.

While nothing is official yet, reliable information indicates the switch in question (at the north end of what is known as Silica Siding) was an Electric Lock hand operated switch , meaning it is controlled manually, regardless of whether the signal system is operating or not.  Sources tell me it was found in tact, lined and locked in the reverse position (lined for movement from the main track to the siding).

The CSX crew had placed the 2 units and 30 some odd multilevels in the siding approximately 35 minutes before the incident and had reported in the "clear" to the dispatcher, giving up their Main Track Authority (EC-1 form). In layman's terms this simply means that they were giving up their authority to be on the main track at this location, their equipment was clear of the main  and all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement.

AMTRAK 91 was proceeding through the limits with proper authority (EC-1)  and had no reason to believe their route was not properly lined.

How and why the switch at the north end of the siding was left improperly lined and by whom is what the NTSB investigation will bring out.

I do hope this answers some questions without confusing the matter any further. Unfortunately This is shaping up to be a Human Factor accident caused by a misaligned switch. Again it emphasizes how even the most fundamental rules of operation need to be adhered to as railroading can be very unforgiving when Operating Rules compliance is not followed through.

CJ

GP 40 posted:

FWIW....Some comments from having spent almost 4 decades working in the Operating Department of CSX and its' predecessors......'Signal Suspensions are relativity common on CSX. They are employed to allow operations to continue when updates and/or changes are being made to the physical track structure and/or signal system on a particular section of railroad. Instructions are issued and are very specific as to what rules are in effect and how train and equipment  movements are to be made through the limits during the suspension.  This is accomplished by the use of Track Warrant Control and EC-1 Forms (CSXs' authority for movement in non-signaled territory among other uses)  In this case the signal suspension was implemented due to the need to make changes necessary for installation of PTC. It had been planned to take effect Saturday morning and expire Sunday evening.

While nothing is official yet, reliable information indicates the switch in question (at the north end of what is known as Silica Siding) was an Electric Lock hand operated switch , meaning it is controlled manually, regardless of whether the signal system is operating or not.  Sources tell me it was found in tact, lined and locked in the reverse position (lined for movement from the main track to the siding).

The CSX crew had placed the 2 units and 30 some odd multilevels in the siding approximately 35 minutes before the incident and had reported in the "clear" to the dispatcher, giving up their Main Track Authority (EC-1 form). In layman's terms this simply means that they were giving up their authority to be on the main track at this location, their equipment was clear of the main  and all switches were properly lined and locked for normal movement.

AMTRAK 91 was proceeding through the limits with proper authority (EC-1)  and had no reason to believe their route was not properly lined.

How and why the switch at the north end of the siding was left improperly lined and by whom is what the NTSB investigation will bring out.

I do hope this answers some questions without confusing the matter any further. Unfortunately This is shaping up to be a Human Factor accident caused by a misaligned switch. Again it emphasizes how even the most fundamental rules of operation need to be adhered to as railroading can be very unforgiving when Operating Rules compliance is not followed through.

CJ

 

As bad as it is, it could have been worse and could have easily turned out to be another Graniteville. 

That one gave us SPAF forms...

Thanks for the up date GP40....    If I  remember correctly If an  electric lock switch is not line normal it's impossible to  close the electric control box.  I wonder if it was also left open as well....

HW  I don't believe all main line switches in CTC have electric locks. 

I've lined a few.

Note this summary of the DM&E wreck in 2009. Pretty similar to the Amtrak-CSX wreck.

On July 14, 2009, about 2:08 a.m., central daylight time, southbound Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad freight train B61-13, went into Bettendorf Yard in Bettendorf, Iowa, due to a misaligned switch and struck 19 stationary railcars. The impact fatally injured the locomotive engineer and the conductor. There were no wayside signals or other devices to convey the position of the hand-operated switch on the main track leading into the north yard sufficiently in advance to allow the approaching train to stop. The train was moving at the authorized speed of 25 mph and was operating under valid track warrant authority. Track warrants are authorizations issued by a dispatcher for a train to occupy a certain segment of track for a certain period of time. Track warrant authority is obtained and released through communication between train crews and the dispatcher. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the BNSF Railway local train RCHI4274-13I crew releasing track warrant authority before returning the north yard hand-operated switch to the correct position. Contributing to the accident was the dispatcher for the Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad granting track warrant authority to Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad train B61-13 without holding a job briefing, which would confirm the accurate positions of all applicable main track switches. Also contributing to the accident was a hand-operated switch position reflector target that could not be observed by the crew of train B61-13 at a sufficient distance to stop the train and avoid the accident.

Lew Schneider