Not an expert but it seems to me that the crew did a good job. People will sit back and pick apart every second and say they could have done this and should have done that a little quicker. The human being when faced with unexpected conditions has to process and then react. That takes real time. bottom line, they gave up their lives trying to save all the passengers and crew they were responsible for. They are heroes to me.
Heros to me too. I don't like the idea of going to work one day never to come home again to my family. I watch the fellas work switches in the Keyser CSX Yard all the time.
Isn't this what the CSX crew should have done? Bring the autoracks to the switch, drop off a brakeman or conductor. He waits until the train passes the switch, lines it for the siding, calls his engineer and the train is backed into the siding. Now, the lead engine can stop after running into the siding, and pick up the conductor or brakeman, who should have lined the switch for the main, or the brakeman and or conductor could have walked back to the engines, after lining the switch for the main.
That of course supposes that the siding job had a crew of two.
Ed
For what's it worth, did the weather conditions play factor into the misaligned switch? Don't know what the conditions were at 2:30 am Sun. but 4 hours later the site was in a torrential rain downpour. At 2:30 am, I feel sure the Amtrak crew was having some visual difficulty seeing the tracks at the speed of 55 mph. Driving a car and finding the white lines was difficult at 6:30 am.
Right or wrong?? Just my opinions and observations.
Tommy
Compounding the sadness of this accident is that the AMTRAK engineer had been worried about his own safety: Michael Kempf
Mr. Robert Sumwalt: Chairman of the NTSB
Short Biography
Robert Sumwalt III, the head of the National Transportation Safety Board and a Columbia native, is at the Midlands in response to the Amtrak crash in Cayce, Gov. Henry McMaster said.
Sumwalt, of Columbia’s Heathwood neighborhood, was nominated to lead the agency by President Donald Trump, confirmed by the U.S. Senate and sworn in in August.
He began his tenure with NTSB in 2006 when then-President George W. Bush appointed him to vice chairman of the board.
Sumwalt is best known for acting as NTSB’s spokesman after the fatal 2015 derailment of an Amtrak train in Philadelphia.
A graduate of Dreher High School and the University of South Carolina, Sumwalt spent years as a pilot for Piedmont Airlines and U.S. Airways. He later headed the aviation department of SCANA.
Gary
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PTC or cab signaling doesn't work when it is shut down for maintenance, as seems to be the case, and the track is still used but with DCS or verbal control in the mean time.
As soon as manual block rules are substituted for PTC or CS, which is often the case when PTC or CS systems are under maintenance or repair, the system of operation falls back to 1800's technology, thus negating any safety attributes.
The operators of the trains are thrown into a situation that is much different that what they are used to. Reverting to manual block or DCS rules from CS rules can be difficult.
Another factor is the removal of intermediate signals between interlocking. This is done as a cost cutting measure but it is detrimental to safety. It is a disturbing trend in the rail industry, but I cannot say for sure it was the case with the CSX line involved...
Tom
Thanks to Big Jim's link above, that same paper is reporting the Engineer DID apply the brakes when noticing something went wrong. [for those reading the discussion on the previous page of this thread]
http://www.thestate.com/news/l...rticle198563109.html
Quote for The State:"The Amtrak train’s brakes were applied only five seconds before a recording of the crash ended,
indicating the crew had almost no time to react before the impact, according to information investigators have obtained.
The train was moving at 50 mph at the time of impact, down from the 56 mph speed it had been traveling, Sumwalt said."
Where are the CTC signals and power switches . I can't find any in the Pic or videos posted.
Gregg posted:Where are the CTC signals and power switches . I can't find any in the Pic or videos posted.
Again,,,,,,,,All those switches at that location are manual/HAND THROW with electric locks! Thus, any signals would be in advance of the location show in all the photos & videos.
"Isn't this what the CSX crew should have done? Bring the autoracks to the switch, drop off a brakeman or conductor. He waits until the train passes the switch, lines it for the siding, calls his engineer and the train is backed into the siding. Now, the lead engine can stop after running into the siding, and pick up the conductor or brakeman, who should have lined the switch for the main, or the brakeman and or conductor could have walked back to the engines, after lining the switch for the main.
That of course supposes that the siding job had a crew of two.
Ed"
Ed someone must be on the end of the train. I would guess the conductor threw the switch and road the rear of the train back. That would be for a two man crew. If there was a third person yes he would have gotten dropped off and manned the switch.
Jamie
Again. I know the Switch left open is an Electric lock switch . I've lined a number of them. I still want to know the location of the siding power switches and CTC signals . (either to the north or south.)
BTW . I still don't consider this track (where the freight was) in question a siding as in CTC territory....Why would you have hand thrown switches with Electric locks at the meeting points. You wouldn't That would be a step backwards however switching crews might get in the clear on this track .
Gregg posted:Again. I know the Switch left open is an Electric lock switch . I've lined a number of them. I still want to know the location of the siding power switches and CTC signals . (either to the north or south.)
I must assume that you missed/overlooked the fact that THERE ARE NO POWER SWITCHES IN THE AREA!
BTW . I still don't consider this track (where the freight was) in question a siding as in CTC territory....Why would you have hand thrown switches with Electric locks at the meeting points. You wouldn't That would be a step backwards however switching crews might get in the clear on this track .
Why do you continue to debate the current known facts in this tragic crash? Why CSX does the things they do, is beyond me.
Gregg, I am sure CSX did not consult you on their operations. The procedure of manual switches on passing sidings is a common practice especially on dark territories. If you do not agree with them, please do not apply to work for them.
I wish others would show the same reserves as the NTSB has releasing their information.
Come on now, I worked train orders for 30 years along with CTC.. I'm just trying to get a feel for the territory.
Sure we know the switch was left open but why??
Gene is this part of your territory Isn't this single track CTC territory....
Gregg, you want to get the feel, then google the line and follow it.
It was part of the Florence Division when I was on it. I know plenty of people who worked on it. It was not a part of my home territory. I was mainly on the A line in SC, and all over NC.
FWIW-- Any passenger train operating in the state of Maryland over tracks used in Acela service had (if purchased from about 2006 on) to be capable of 125 mph operation, tested at 135 mph. This required a service braking capability of 4 fpsps (feet/sec/sec) in deceleration, from 135 mph. [This requirement would make them compatible with the existing signal system, I believe. IIRC, that had been originally 90 mph with 2 fpsps braking, tested at 100 mph.]
This requirement would over time have affected a large number of the Amtrak car fleet. Using this data, I was able to ascertain that the "holiday" excursion train that hit the trash truck was able, in emergency, to exert a braking rate of 4.5 fpsps. I used 61 mph or 90 fps (feet per second). This was a train of ten 85' cars, with a P42 engine on each end. Based on the stopped photo, one P42 and 10 cars ran by the point of impact (850+65?) = 915' to stop,
This stopping rate can be calculated by taking the average speed (45 fps), dividing it into the distance to stop to get seconds to stop (20 seconds) to get 4.5 fpsps. [Under time pressure, I do these things in my head, so there is a slight amount of rounding off.] I believe there was an NTSB comment as to the relation of emergency application to impact [hose separation?] but I can't now recall it. I did notice the force on standees was 0.14g, just short of the 0.15g limit being adopted for commuter ops in VA over CSX tracks.
At any rate, that's how it's done, and an example. I do not have the time available in the coming week to research this train, but leave it to others. At a glance, it does not appear there was time to stop, but time to make some reduction in speed. Of course here there appear to have been only 6 cars for braking; I do not known whether the engine brakes would apply without additional action; whether there was an electric brake line, et cetera.
The sounding of the horn suggests to me a warning, showing concern in case of employees being on the ground in the dark. That the braking only came later suggests that the question must also be asked as to whether the obstruction was lit in any way (there is also a curve on the approach, further limiting vision).
Lighting, the same question I had for the MetroNorth accident above Valhalla-- the traction power transformer of many tons had an overhead light to protect it against theft (?) behind its chain link fence... why not the crossing 100 feet away?
--Frank
This pretty much sizes up the cause of this accident......No surprises. What some have suspected all along. Simply put, 100% compliance with the operating rules in effect at the time, on the part of the CSX crew, would have prevented this incident. For whatever reason the choice was made to circumvent the rules. As is the case in many of these types of tragedies I have been familiar with, the person(s) whose actions (or lack thereof) were responsible for causing the event are left to live with their mistake, while the ones properly performing their duties meet their Maker. My thoughts are with everyone involved.....the CSX crew members have quite a weight to bear for the rest of their lives.
NTSB Looks At Disabled Signals, Locked Switch In Latest Deadly Amtrak Crash
An aerial view of the site in Cayce, S.C., where an Amtrak passenger train (bottom right) slammed into a CSX freight train early Sunday morning. At least two Amtrak crew members were killed and more than 100 people injured, authorities said.
Updated at 11:59 p.m. ET
Federal investigators say a track switch locked in the wrong position appears to have led to Sunday's deadly Amtrak collision with an idle CSX freight train, and they are hesitant to say this latest wreck — the fourth fatal Amtrak incident in seven weeks — is part of a broader problem with what some have called a "lax safety culture" at Amtrak.
Bound for Miami from Penn Station in New York City, Amtrak train No. 91 was traveling through central South Carolina when it was diverted onto a side track, where it collided head-on with a parked freight train at about 2:45 a.m. ET. Two crew members were killed and more than 100 passengers injured.
Investigators for the National Transportation Safety Board appear to be focusing on two possibly related problems that may have contributed to the head-on collision. One is the position of a track switch that steered the passenger train off the mainline track and onto the siding where the freight train was parked; the second is that wayside signals in the area were down for maintenance and upgrades, and inoperative at the time of the crash.
NTSB investigators say it appears a CSX freight railroad crew failed to flip a switch back to the mainline setting after pulling its freight train onto the side track. NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt says the switch was still locked into a position diverting train traffic from the mainline to the siding, steering the Amtrak train onto the side track at about 56 mph, where it slammed into the parked freight train.
The crash killed the Amtrak train's engineer and a conductor. More than 100 other passengers and crew members were transported to hospitals, most with minor injuries, though authorities say eight still remained hospitalized as of midday Monday.
Sumwalt says that after pulling their train off the mainline and onto the siding, the CSX crew members should have relined that switch to the main track — and that they had reported doing so.
"They had already, in fact, released their authority back to the dispatcher," said Sumwalt at a media briefing Monday near the scene of the train crash. "They had already said, 'We're through,' which would indicate that they've done everything they need to do." But he says the switch still was padlocked into the position of steering trains into the siding.
Meanwhile, Sumwalt said, the trackside signaling system in the area — which would have alerted the engineer to the position of the switch — was inoperative: "It's our understanding that they were doing upgrades to the signal system to get it ready for positive train control."
When signals are out, Sumwalt says, the railroad usually would operate under a system of track warrants, with the dispatcher authorizing the train to operate in a certain area. Whether that was happening Sunday morning is not yet clear.
The head of Amtrak wasted no time in placing the blame on CSX, which owns, operates and controls the tracks Amtrak uses in the area.
Reuters reports that in an email message to staff Sunday night, Amtrak President and CEO Richard Anderson said the passenger train was "on the track as dispatched by CSX, the host railroad ... our crew on 91 was cleared to proceed by CSX dispatch, but CSX had lined and padlocked the switch off the mainline to the siding, causing the collision."
Regardless of why the train was switched onto the wrong track, railroad experts and train crash investigators say positive train control — the system CSX was working to install in its signaling system at the time of the crash — would very likely have prevented the fatal crash.
Positive train control uses GPS, wireless radio signals and onboard computers to track exactly where trains are and will automatically slow down or stop trains if they're going too fast or nearing a collision with another train. Essentially, the system overrides human error, taking over if the engineer misses a slow or stop signal or is otherwise distracted.
"An operational PTC system is designed to prevent this kind of accident," Sumwalt said Sunday.
Railroads are facing a deadline at the end of this year to fully install the technology. A decade ago, Congress mandated the systems be used on passenger and freight railroads nationwide after a commuter train in Los Angeles slammed into a freight train in 2008, killing 25 people.
The railroads initially were given until 2015 to develop and implement the safety system, but many of them balked at the cost and complexity of creating it. When it became clear that few, if any, could meet that date, Congress pushed the deadline back to the end of 2018 for installing equipment trackside and on locomotives and until 2020 for implementation for some railroads.
Amtrak and commuter railroads have had a particularly tough time securing the funding needed to develop and purchase the equipment, radio frequency bandwith, and technology required for positive train control. And because Amtrak runs its trains on freight railroad tracks across much of the country, its system has to be able to communicate with all of those companies' systems. So Amtrak can make progress only as fast as the freight lines do.
On a conference call with reporters, Anderson said Sunday's crash underscores the importance of meeting the year-end deadline for widespread implementation of PTC. But The Associated Press reports that Anderson also acknowledged that the biggest impediment is that private companies must work together to put the technology in place.
Safety advocates and regulators have accused the railroads of dragging their feet in implementing positive train control, pointing out that the technology has been around for decades.
Among them are some members of Congress. Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., said Sunday that "inaction is inexcusable." Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney, D-N.Y., added Monday that "time's up" on delays and that 2018 "has to be a hard, legal deadline for all passenger railroads to implement PTC."
In November, at an NTSB meeting to announce the results of the investigation into a fatal Amtrak crash outside Philadelphia in April 2016, Sumwalt blasted the railroad for its "lax" attitude, saying "Amtrak's safety culture is failing, and is primed to fail again."
That warning seems prophetic now, as there have been four deadly Amtrak accidents in less than two months' time.
On Jan. 31 an Amtrak train carrying Republican members of Congress to a retreat in West Virginia hit a garbage truck at a crossing near Charlottesville, Va., killing one person on the truck. A North Carolina couple was killed Jan. 14 when their SUV was hit by an Amtrak train; police say it appeared the driver of the SUV tried to go around lowered crossing gates. And on Dec. 16 an Amtrak train making its inaugural run down a new route between Seattle and Portland derailed as it entered a curve on a highway overpass, speeding along at more than 50 mph above the posted limit. The engineer in that crash says he did not see a key milepost or a signal warning to reduce speed in the minutes leading up to the crash.
But Sumwalt warns against connecting all the accidents — which all appear to have different causes — to the failing safety culture he pointed to in the 2015 crash. For example, two of the recent crashes may have been caused by drivers trying to cross tracks when they shouldn't have.
"It's very important that we have to look at each of these accidents in isolation to be able to determine if there are systemic issues," said Sumwalt at Monday's briefing. "Are we willing to say that there's a systemic issue with Amtrak? No, we're not."
Pardon the newbie question, and if it's been answered before, but are manual switches electrically tied into some signal up the line? If so, and it's a yard of some type, would just the switches on the main into the yard be tied into the signals?
JeffPo posted:Pardon the newbie question, and if it's been answered before, but are manual switches electrically tied into some signal up the line? If so, and it's a yard of some type, would just the switches on the main into the yard be tied into the signals?
Yes . An open main line switch (electric lock or other) in CTC territory would show the block as occupied on the train dispatchers panel . .He won't be able to set up a signal for train wanting to enter that block....
I'm not sure where the block begins and ends in this instance.....
Another question: would PTC prevent grade crossing accidents?
Jon 
KOOLjock1 posted:Another question: would PTC prevent grade crossing accidents?
Jon
Nope. Especially when idiots drive around the lowered crossing gates with flashing red lights!
Thanks Hot! I was expecting that to be the answer, but wasn’t really sure.
Jon
Would PTC actually have prevented this crash??? I say no!
If it is GPS based, it wouldn't have detected a misaligned switch, and furthermore, wouldn't have provided enough warning to prevent this one, once it did detect that the Amtrak train was out of position. Only a working signal system would. The CSX crew picked the worst day to screw up.
PTC would have prevented Washington State and Philadelphia crashes and many others. There is NO prevention method for vehicles on the track, but trains always win those disputes with stupid people anyway.
Big Boy 4005. It PTC was up and running, it would have prevented this from happening. PTC would have brought the Amtrak to a stop before the switch.
Big_Boy_4005 posted:Would PTC actually have prevented this crash??? I say no!
Correct, since the signal system in that area was in "Suspension", i.e. NO SIGNALS.
If it is GPS based, it wouldn't have detected a misaligned switch,
Actually it would have, since the switch had an electric lock on it, and was NOT in the "normal" position for main line operation. However, the signal system be in "Suspension" would have negated any "notification" to an oncoming train that the switch was NOT in the correct position.
and furthermore, wouldn't have provided enough warning to prevent this one, once it did detect that the Amtrak train was out of position.
Yes it would have, again if the signal system was NOT in "Suspension". Besides, the Amtrak train was definitely NOT "out of position".
Only a working signal system would.
Bingo!
The CSX crew picked the worst day to screw up.
Bingo, again!
PTC would have prevented Washington State and Philadelphia crashes and many others.
Correct.
There is NO prevention method for vehicles on the track, but trains always win those disputes with stupid people anyway.
Correct again.
Thanks Jack, I'm catching onto this stuff.
In order to get the full benefits of PTC, you need a working signal system, otherwise you're only half covered.
Quote:
"Sumwalt says that after pulling their train off the mainline and onto the siding, the CSX crew members should have relined that switch to the main track — and that they had reported doing so."
Okay, so according to this, the CSX freight PULLED into the siding. And, from the photos it shows that the CSX train on the siding was impacted on the head end of their train, not rear ended as would have been the case if they had not lined behind their train and IF the Amtrak train was overtaking them, which they were not.
So... if they PULLED into the siding, and closed the switch behind them... and that's the switch they "should have relined" then this accident would NOT have happened, as the opposing Amtrak train would simply have trailed through a misaligned switch. The switch would be damaged, but the Amtrak train would have proceeded with little issue. BUT... it was the head end switch that was not lined correctly.
Now, IF they pulled into the siding from the "west" (or whatever) and the "east" siding switch was lined for the siding... and IF they couldn't make a visual on the switch up ahead around the curve, a switch that they DIDN'T use and SHOULD be lined for the main by rule, then they could easily have been sitting in the hole thinking they were well in the clear and thinking all was well since they didn't use the "east" switch and likely couldn't see it on account of the curve.
Obviously SOMEONE left the "east" switch lined for the siding. But if this crew didn't touch it/see it then who left the "east" switch lined for the siding? MOW? Signal Dept?
Andre
Andre,
You are totally confused. This is a North/South line. The CSX train had pulled north past the switch in question and shoved south back into the siding. The AMTRAK train was also heading south.
Not only what you just stated above but in all probability the conductor on the CSX freight had to align the switch for his train to be shoved into the siding, my only question would be if he rode the last car carrier into the siding or did he get in the engine when it cleared the switch in either case I would think it would be his responsibility to realign the switch for mainline operation unless he had orders not to. JMO
hibar posted:Not only what you just stated above but in all probability the conductor on the CSX freight had to align the switch for his train to be shoved into the siding, my only question would be if he rode the last car carrier into the siding or did he get in the engine when it cleared the switch in either case I would think it would be his responsibility to realign the switch for mainline operation unless he had orders not to. JMO
Good question.... I suspect If he rode the cars into the siding he may have only gone so far . Even though it's on a curve he can see far enough because there are no other cars and he is familiar with the territory. He may have dropped off part way and headed towards the engines.. Was there another crew member besides the Conductor... We don't know. I don't think we know anything about the freight crew... Experience etc.
Nothing new from NTSB for at least for 2 days. One little thing I noticed about the last briefing was... Apparently there is a derail on this track and it was put back on (at least that the way I heard it).... makes you think, they put the derail back on but what happen to the switch??
Gregg posted:Nothing new from NTSB for at least for 2 days. One little thing I noticed about the last briefing was... Apparently there is a derail on this track and it was put back on (at least that the way I heard it).... makes you think, they put the derail back on but what happen to the switch??
Simple, someone, i.e. from CSX, "forgot" to restore the main line switch to main line traffic!
Hot Water posted:Gregg posted:Nothing new from NTSB for at least for 2 days. One little thing I noticed about the last briefing was... Apparently there is a derail on this track and it was put back on (at least that the way I heard it).... makes you think, they put the derail back on but what happen to the switch??
Simple, someone, i.e. from CSX, "forgot" to restore the main line switch to main line traffic!
Yep it looks that way.... The only reason I posted is.... Switches and derails kind of go together.... If you line a switch you would also remove the derail.... Put the derail back on and then line the switch back normal ... . So sad....
Here is a Local investigative report regarding PTC. Do you believe?
OK, I am assuming the switch in question has a lock and key. Who has the key? How are they tracked?
And they are saying the signalling was not in service due to instillation of PTC. But in the future, suppose they had to cut off the signalling, say for signal work. To me, then NO train could operate because the lead locomotive could not read the PTC signal. Or is there a way to turn the PTC receiver in the locomotive?
Dominic Mazoch posted:OK, I am assuming the switch in question has a lock and key.
Yes. Standard "modern era" weather-proof switch lock and non-duplicable serial numbered switch key.
Who has the key?
So many T & E service, M of W service, and Signal Service employees that the count would be in the thousands.
How are they tracked?
By the serial number on the key, and who it was issued to.
And they are saying the signalling was not in service due to instillation of PTC.
Yes, that's what has been reported/established.
But in the future, suppose they had to cut off the signalling, say for signal work. To me, then NO train could operate because the lead locomotive could not read the PTC signal. Or is there a way to turn the PTC receiver in the locomotive?
Yes, there is a way to continue operations with PTC disabled, but there are many restrictions.
We've been running trains for more than a hundred years without PTC, Trip Optimizer and all that other stuff. You disable PTC and run the train as per the rules.
If CTC is OUT, then PTC would HAVE TO be disabled.
Many places still do not have PTC, and trains still run. Even after implementation of PTC, it is disabled quite often for one reason or another.
I can tell you that BNSF, UP, and do NOT keep track of switch keys. There is no serial #, and you can find them at just about every swap meet out there. Here in Abq, NM, most locks are still the old style Santa Fe locks that have been around for decades.
The conductor would of had to take the derail off, line the switch into the siding, protect the shove into the siding via a few different rules, and then line the switch and derail back. There are several rules in place to ensure and verify that switch was lined back for mainline movement. This same exact scenario has happened many times through the years, that's why there are more and more rules that govern this type of move. There's a form we have to use to log the date, time, and who lined the switch back. It has to be briefed within the crew AND to the dispatcher. That form has to be retained with the conductor until the end of his tour of duty, just like any track warrant that was issued to them. There is NOT just one person at fault here. Remember the GCOR rule states the engineer and conductor are JOINTLY responsible. We all check each other, all of the time for a reason.
Laidoffsick posted:We've been running trains for more than a hundred years without PTC, Trip Optimizer and all that other stuff.
Nigh on two centuries now.
Yes, accidents happened prior to the implementation of the gee-whiz gear as the understanding of the needs matured. But accidents will continue happening after the implementation, too. No system is perfect.
It's a real shame, but it is the cost of mechanization, and nobody wants to go back to walking everywhere, so we accept the cost. Consider the number of deaths each year in automobile accidents. They vastly outnumber the deaths in rail accidents but rarely merit reporting and are largely ignored except by the people directly involved.
I know that people are working on self-driving cars, but I am not having any of it. I have experienced too many computer, network, and mechanical failures to allow a vehicle to control itself if I am in it. I will accept the (still fairly remote) chance of a fatal vehicle crash operated by someone who cares rather over the chances of such a crash operated by a machine that doesn't.
I will accept the (still fairly remote) chance of a fatal vehicle crash operated by someone who cares rather over the chances of such a crash operated by a machine that doesn't.
The problem is distracted driving. And it gets worse and worse all the time. Too many features controlled by too many multi-function buttons or touch screens. Too many people doing things like eating and driving while driving. Answering cell phones, reading and sending text messages. In my neighborhood it isn't the kids. It's the adults.
My wife's new car has a bunch of cool features to assist drivers. One problem: going back to driving a car that doesn't have those features once a person is accustomed to them.
One thing I'd like to have: a backup camera.
Sorry for the off-topic post.
