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Originally Posted by rattler21:

Bill,

Where did you find the information about incorrect placards on these loads?

John

The article from the link indicates the label had the wrong goods for the train which originated from Canada and the US, so does this mean that the train started from the US with the wrong classification and into Canada as such or did that get reclassified once it crossed the border?

 

If it was incorrectly classified in the US then does the responsibility lie with the originator in the US and any claims be logged in the US and not Canada?

Originally Posted by rattler21:

Bill,

Where did you find the information about incorrect placards on these loads?

John

 

It was a press report of a Transportation Safety Board of Canada report. This is a Rail Safety Advisory Report from the TSBC web site on the labeling.  There also is a Rail Safety Advisory Letter. These events took place in North Dakota.

 

Also there is a news release.

 

"The petroleum crude oil had originated from New Town, North Dakota and was destined to an oil refinery in Saint John, NewBrunswick. The tank cars were picked up at New Town by Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) and transported to Montréal. The train, with the same waybill information, was then interchanged to MMA.

 

From a review of the procedures in place at the rail loading facility at New Town, it was determined that:

  • The product loaded into the train originated from 11 different suppliers with producing wells in the Bakken Shale formation region of North Dakota.
  • The product had been transported by highway trucks from a number of supplier facilities to New Town, where the product was transloaded into the rail tank cars, with about three truck loads to fill each rail tank car.
  • Information contained in 10 different material safety data sheets (MSDS) provided by the suppliers varied widely and was contradictory in some areas. For example, while all MSDSs indicated that the product was a Class 3 dangerous good, the packing group information varied from PG I to PG III.
  • At least 4 of the MSDSs indicated a PG I product. Two other MSDSs indicated that it was necessary to “determine flash point to accurately classify packing group”.
  • According to the shipping documents from the trucks, the product was being shipped from the suppliers to the rail loading facility as a PG II product.
  • Once the product was transloaded into the tank cars, the shipper billed all the tank cars out as PG III product.
  • The accident train journal was based on waybill information provided to CP by the shipper.

Petroleum crude oil can have a wide range of flash points and initial boiling points. Therefore, such types of Class 3 flammable liquids are further divided into packing groups to better reflect and communicate their hazards. Product samples were taken by the TSB from the 9 intact tank cars that did not derail during the Lac-Mégantic accident. Test results indicate that these product samples had a flash point of less than -35 ºC and an initial boiling point of between 43.9 and 48.5 ºC, which placed this product in the lower end of the crude oil flash point range, well below the PG III threshold. As per the federal regulations, these characteristics correspond with a product that is required to be identified as Class 3, PG II.

 

The lower flash point of the crude oil explains in part why it ignited so quickly once the Class 111 tank cars were breached. Since product characteristics are one of the factors to consider when selecting a container for the transport of dangerous goods, this also brings into question the adequacy of Class 111 tank cars for use in transporting large quantities of low flash–point flammable liquids (PG I and PG II). TSB testing of the tank car components and more detailed analysis of the fuel samples are ongoing as these are issues the TSB will be examining in greater detail in its investigation.

 

The PG III designation is used for less volatile flammable liquids that have higher flash points and are therefore less prone to easy ignition at ambient temperatures when involved in a transportation accident (i.e., they typically generate fewer flammable vapours at normal ambient temperatures)."

Last edited by Bill Robb
Originally Posted by Ukaflyer:
Originally Posted by rattler21:

Bill,

Where did you find the information about incorrect placards on these loads?

John

The article from the link indicates the label had the wrong goods for the train which originated from Canada and the US, so does this mean that the train started from the US with the wrong classification and into Canada as such or did that get reclassified once it crossed the border?

 

If it was incorrectly classified in the US then does the responsibility lie with the originator in the US and any claims be logged in the US and not Canada?

See my response above for the Transportation Safety Board of Canada links.

This is about 40 miles from where I live. I know that stretch of track well. It's fairly straight, level and slow. 35 km/h = about 20 mph. The tankers are all usually clearly marked as to contents and DO NOT carry general placards like you'd see on the side of a tank truck, which you guys know already.

"Liquified Petroleum Gas" can range from the extremley volatile liquified propane to relatively harmless (although still flammable) liquified methane. "Crude" oil isn't quite the gooey black tar stuff you think of when it's transported. Anything that is transported anywhere in any form and by any means has to meet a very specific and stringent specification for the end product. I work in the oil and gas industry and (keep in mind all this stuff I'm about to say is only Alberta related, I'm not sure about the Excited States or any other province in this regard) there's very high repercussions for production of an end processed product that is off spec. Let me say that again, EXTREME REPERCUSSIONS. These range from a total shutdown of your plant and field until the custody transfer meter is satisfied, to fines and lawsuits for breaking contractual specification.  There's something in place called a "Custody Transfer Meter". These meters IMMEDIATELY (blink of an eye) shut a spring-loaded shutdown valve when they sense something that's not quite right when the product is transferred from the production company (upstream) to the transport company / buyer (midstream). The midstream company then transports the product, usually always by pipeline, to the receiver (downstream) company who refines and processes the product even more to get it into its many usable parts.  Every process along the way from in the ground to in the trucks/railcars/pipelines is monitored intensively by hundreds of people and machines as well as (I shat you not) MILLIONS of sensors and meters to produce something that is cost effective and within spec. The sour (H2S) in those tank cars mentioned was either a slightly off spec product (sour is allowed in sweet as it can never be 100% stripped) or was from the incorrect cleaning (washing instead of steaming clean) of the tank cars. Maintenance is more likely to blame.

There's hundreds of thousands of these rail cars moving around North America at any given second. As the moniker goes, $h!t happens. It'll always happen regardless of how many people get their paws in the pie. Look at your own model railroads. How many times have you gotten a derailment? CN and CP are probably 1000% safer than you are.

$.25
Last edited by SteamWolf
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