Two Union Pacific trains collide head on in OK. This is supposedly
single track CTC with a 30 mile stretch of straight track? Occurred
about 9am.
http://www.guymondailyherald.com/content/breaking-crews-still-battling-blaze-train-collision-scene-one-firefighter-transported-heat-r
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Wow! Very sad. On the map it looks like straight and level track for miles.
Sad news indeed....
More information here: (Fox news today - truck driver account of events.)
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012...e-in-rural-oklahoma/
Alex
Very flat & very straight.
Believe the crew change point is Dalhart, TX.
Was an old Rock Island line that joined the SP at Tucumcari, NM
If the crew went to sleep or something else distracted them, don;t they have to touch a button every so many seconds or the loco shuts down, How could this happen??
Very sad news, I wonder if that part of the UP sytem had PTC (Positive Train Control) installed, which is designed to prevent accidents such as this?
Joe
If the crew went to sleep or something else distracted them, don;t they have to touch a button every so many seconds or the loco shuts down, How could this happen??
Some Engineer's have conditioned themselves to re-set the alertness device sub-conciously, i.e. "in their sleep". Besides, at 68 to 70 MPH, as stated by the truck driver pacing the train, a LOT can happen in 30 to 60 seconds between re-setting the alertness device.
I read a blurb this morning that said the siding was about a mile away. Could both crews have thought the other train was on the siding (it is open flat land afterall) until the last second and didn't react in time?
I read a blurb this morning that said the siding was about a mile away. Could both crews have thought the other train was on the siding (it is open flat land afterall) until the last second and didn't react in time?
Highly unlikely in CTC territory.
Looks like they recovered the bodies, very sad. Seems like a very unexpected place for an accident.
Does anyone have information as to how this occured?
This is two days old: (portion)
<< The National Transportation Safety Board said it appears signals were working properly at the time of the wreck, and that one of the trains passing through the flat landscape should have pulled onto a side track. The NTSB said there was "no survivable space" in the locomotives' cabins following the collision.
The NTSB could release a preliminary report within two weeks, though it could be a year before a final report is available, NTSB official Mark Rosekind said.
Former Federal Railroad Administration official Gil Carmichael said Tuesday that it was "very unusual" for such a collision on such flat landscape. He said it sounded like one of the crew members made an error. >>
Source:
http://www.ajc.com/news/nation...n-error-1464456.html
Alex
Perhaps the one conductor who lived can shed some light onto what was going on....on his train anyway.....time will tell.
Perhaps the one conductor who lived can shed some light onto what was going on....on his train anyway.....time will tell.
Especially if he was on the train that should have stopped to let the other one pass.
Now, what about PTC?
If a train gets a false clear, will the PTC system radio the same info to the train?
Does the UP require its train crews to call signals over the radio?
Now with an MU'ed consist: If the lead unit gets smashed, can they get the "black boxes" out of the following units?
Yes
"Does the UP require its train crews to call signals over the radio?"
I've been wondering that, too.
Also where the collision happened relative to the siding, is it known how the switches were lined? That is, was one train ever in the siding?
This by Wyhog..."4 The crew may have been distracted by something on the train such as restarting a locomotive that had died." This made me wonder if that's how the conductor of one train lived, he might not have been on the lead engine.
Ed
Does the UP require its train crews to call signals over the radio?
No. But I'll bet they start now.
Also where the collision happened relative to the siding, is it known how the switches were lined? That is, was one train ever in the siding?
This by Wyhog..."4 The crew may have been distracted by something on the train such as restarting a locomotive that had died." This made me wonder if that's how the conductor of one train lived, he might not have been on the lead engine.
Ed
Current think from the UP folks that are VERY familiar running over that same territory is:
1) The eastbound train (running at 68 MPH according to a trucker who was pacing right beside the train, and he actually witnessed the whole thing), MAY have bee supposed to hold the main line, just west of the impact. However, for what ever reason or reasons, he ran past the absolute block (double red) at the east end of the passing siding.
2) The westbound train was supposed to take the passing siding, just west of the impact spot, and had already gotten either a double yellow, or a red over yellow, indicating that the power switch was already lighted for him to take the siding at 30 MPH.
3) The westbound train had already slowed, in preparation for entering the siding. The only survivor, the Conductor of the westbound train, jumped prior to impact.
4) A preliminary statement from the FRA/NTSB investigation team indicated that all the signals where functioning properly.
The condition of the east end power switch of the passing siding has NOT ret been released by the FRA/NTSB team, yet. If the 68 MPH eastbound had indeed failed to stop at the absolute red, he would have continued eastward and broken the switch points, which were already aligned for the westbound to take siding.
The governmental agencies are not even releasing speculation like often is given. They might be looking at a very complicated and serious situation. Hopefully it was not an attack on the crew of the Eastbound train.
The governmental agencies are not even releasing speculation like often is given. They might be looking at a very complicated and serious situation. Hopefully it was not an attack on the crew of the Eastbound train.
Is 68 Mph fast for where this occurred? I would think that if that engine had any idea danger was coming that they would have been all over the brakes, so how fast do trains typically move in this area? Is running a train like driving a car where you look at the road in front of you 100% of the time? Such an open area, you would think that they would have seen the approaching danger, and if one engine didn't see the other, wouldn't the one engine be sounding it's emergency horn or have gotten on the radio and given an emergency stop command?
Does the UP require its train crews to call signals over the radio?
No. But I'll bet they start now.
We've been required to call signals, anything other than a green/clear, on the Roseville service unit for a long time.
Greg
Back here, on the CSX Mountain Sub and the Keystone Sub, the crew call all signals, clears included.
Ed Mullaln
Same here, and dispatchers also let us know where we are meeting trains.
Goodwell Ok. is only 80 miles from where I live. Here in Southwest Ks./Ok. panhandle we do have hills and valleys. There are no trees to speak of and the hills arn't much. You only need a rise or dip of approx. 15 feet to obscure the headlight of an oncoming train. Also we have been having 100+ heat, makes for some very interesting mirages. Our 40 mph winds which adds the blowing dust factor to the visability. That Union Pacific route runs almost all trains at close to 70 mph on that line.
IF both trains were going at 70 mph and were 5 miles apart when they finally seen each other that only gives them about 2-3 minutes to react. Not much time.
Brad Jackson
Interesting information Brad, however the eastbound train was at 68 MPH, while the westbound train had already slowed to about 40 MPH. A 2 to 3 minute time span is actually quite a long time, especially when the eastbound was covering a mile each 55 seconds, approximately.
Does UPRR use a signal awareness form, on which the Conductor records the time and the aspect of each signal when it is passed?
The conductors have a log book for signals, detectors and other unforeseen restrictions from the dispatcher.
Now, the EB train would have had an advance signal before the control point of the west switch of the siding, the actual signals at the west switch, and the signals at the control point of the east switch of the siding.
Somehow it seems the EB missed at least THREE signals before the crash. More if the siding was long enough to have signals between the two control points.
Now, the EB train would have had an advance signal before the control point of the west switch of the siding, the actual signals at the west switch, and the signals at the control point of the east switch of the siding.
Somehow it seems the EB missed at least THREE signals before the crash.
Since the Federal investigators have stated that the signal system was working as intended, one train obviously passed the end point of its authority to occupy the main track. The list of possible reasons is short and obvious.
It is an unfortunate end to three lives, and the deaths were probably anything but peaceful. The obituary for one of the Engineers was in the Amarillo newspaper this week.
A little bit more info, recently available:
1) Eastbound stack train = 68 MPH.
2) Westbound auto rack train = 17 MPH.
Impact speed = 85 MPH!